

Research Proposal for the Course

*Experimental Economics*

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A lab experiment on young protesters'  
donation decisions

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## Abbreviations

DG	dictator game
FFF	Fridays for Future
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal

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**Abstract:**

This paper draws on insights from various disciplines including economy, psychology and marketing on different mechanisms that motivate donations. It proposes a lab experiment in which these mechanisms are tested through dictator games. To better understand the donor behavior of a politicized youth, participants are recruited at Fridays For Future Demonstrations in Germany. Participants first earn money working on a real effort task and are asked to allocate it between themselves and non-governmental organizations working for the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Findings contribute to research on philanthropy and donor behavior, while also having important implications for charities' fundraising strategies, especially when targeting the youth.

**Keywords: donor behavior, fundraising, lab experiment, protest and donations, Fridays for future**

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## 1. Introduction

“Klimajugend” (“Climate Youth”) is the German-Swiss word of the year 2019, reflecting the increasing importance of and media attention to young people demonstrating for climate action (Neue Züricher Zeitung, 2019). In this paper, I propose to use a lab experiment involving the dictator game (DG) to investigate the degree to which these young protesters are willing to donate and how they can be motivated to do so.

The Fridays for Future (FFF) movement is an international student's movement with regular school-strikes and demonstrations on Fridays, directed against the failure of political leaders to address man-made climate change caused by greenhouse gas emissions (Sommer et al., 2019, p. 2). The aim of the climate strikes is to draw attention to climate policy shortcomings and to ensure compliance with the Paris Convention for climate protection. With its requests and public actions, the movement also supports the implementation of the SDGs, namely SDG 7 - Affordable and clean energy and SDG 13 - Climate action, and is in line with the Agenda 2030, which states that civil society should “participate in the implementation of the SDGs and the mobilization of the necessary resources” (Agenda 2030, p. 12).

Mobilization of resources from civil society usually takes place in the form of donations to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). For fundraising purposes, these organizations address the public with a wide variety of activities and campaigns. To be financially sustainable, NGOs have to find out how people can best be incentivized to contribute to their projects. As this is a question involving individuals making decisions about money allocations, experimental economics offers a range of tools like field and lab experiments that can help researchers to better understand individual's donation decisions.

So far, related experiments have concentrated mainly on the group responsible for the largest

volume of donations: financially strong people of advanced age (Deutscher Spendenrat, 2019, pp. 14-15). However, the share of donations made by people below the age of 40 has been rising in recent years (ibid). And if one wants to allocate funds to future-oriented projects such as sustainable energy and climate initiatives, it makes sense to target the group that is likely to be most affected by these projects: young people. ´

The experiment proposed here concentrates on the participants of the FFF demonstrations, especially adolescents and young adults, and on their willingness to donate for development projects. They take part in a computer-based lab experiment, where they first earn their endorsement in a real-effort task before they are confronted with various donation decisions in the DG. This will test how they react to different strategies designed to increase their willingness to donate.

In DG, students have shown to be less generous than the average (Engels, 2011). Since the participants will be invited to the experiment at a demonstration, however, I expect them to have comparatively strong pro-social values. I expect an increased willingness to donate among people who have already stood up for their value orientation by participating in protests. It is to be expected that on average the participants will have preferences for projects in the field of prevention and mitigation of climate change, as this is the ideal for which they have stood up in their protests.

On the other hand, the target group of this experiment is young adults, which is the group that, in percentage terms, donates less frequently in comparison to all other age groups (Deutscher Spendenrat, 2019). I therefore expect that many of them have never donated before or at least not regularly. It will be interesting to compare whether donation incentives work differently for first-time donors than for regular donors.

The donor attraction methods tested in this experiment are well-established strategies used by NGOs in fundraising campaigns. By investigating their effects on politicized youths and young adults, this experiment not only contributes to research on donor mobilization but is also of great practical value. The insights gained from this experiment can be useful to NGOs in developing fundraising campaigns specifically targeted at youths and young adults. If it turns out that the willingness of demonstration participants to donate is particularly high compared to the average population, this result could for example incentivize NGOs to directly participate in demonstrations and draw attention to their projects and initiatives there.

## 2. Theory

People's motivation to help others by scholars has been studied by scholars from different disciplines, including marketing, economics psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology and evolutionary psychology. Oftentimes, studies simply alert to the fact that motivations behind pro-social behavior, including the decision to donate money, are multicausal (Karlan/Wood, 2014; Gee/Schreck, 2017). Others develop typologies to explain such behavior (Erlandsson et al, 2014; Andreoni, 2006; Vesterlund, 2006; Meier, 2007).

I found the most complete overview of donor motivations to be provided by Bekkers/Wiepking (2011): Based on an overview of literature on charitable giving, they identify eight mechanisms as the most important drivers behind it: Awareness of need; solicitation; costs and benefits; altruism; reputation; psychological benefits; values, and efficacy.

The model predicts that the donors' subjective perception of neediness of the beneficiaries has a positive effect on donations when they are asked to donate. The same holds true if the material costs of giving are lowered by facilitating giving, and also when the donor receives some benefit in exchange for the donation. Following the model, donations should be higher when the perceived impact on the receiver is higher and in settings where the donor expects to gain social reputation by his act of giving. The wish to act in line with one's values can also motivate donations. Donating might evoke a feeling of "warm glow", an almost automatic positive emotional response to the act of giving, caused either by avoiding feelings of guilt or by acting in line with one's self-image or a social norm. Efficacy motivates giving when people contribute to causes that they believe to make the most difference to beneficiaries.

It is widely accepted that several of those mechanisms might work simultaneously and reinforce or weaken each other's effects (ibid., p. 946). Situational conditions or personal characteristics of the donor can act as "moderating factors" that might weaken the effect of a respective mechanism or strengthen it (ibid., pp. 946-953). However, donation decisions do not disclose the underlying motivation; only the outcome, the donation, is observable. An established way to test for the effect of certain motivations and moderating factors are lab experiments, where certain stimuli can be emphasized by framing and their effect tested against neutral framings.

Donation choices, both in laboratory experiments and in the real world, are decisions that resemble a dictator game. The DG was originally developed to measure the extent to which the proposers care for fairness. The Nash-equilibrium, that is, the decision of a rational, benefit-maximizing dictator, would be to keep all the money. However, studies found that only about 20% of the subjects chose to give nothing away while on average, dictators give away 28% of

their endowment (Engel, 2011, p. 5). When the DG involves a charitable donation, these numbers rise considerably (ibid., p. 10), due to one or more of the above-mentioned mechanisms.

### 3. Literature review

The eight mechanisms that drive donation behavior described by Bekkers/Wiepking (2011) have been subject to many studies. The amount of donations depends on the subjective perception of beneficiaries' neediness by the donor (Cheung/Chan, 2000; Lee/Farrell, 2003). Crucial for this is the type and amount of information provided by the experimenters, as they inform potential donors about the needs of victims. Dolinski et al. (2005) found that providing information on neediness increases the likelihood of making donations, but not the contribution. Of course, awareness of need might also be influenced by factors outside the lab, such as mass media coverage (Simon, 1997) or personal closeness to a (potential) beneficiary (Small & Simonsohn, 2006).

Bryant et al. (2003) find that 85% of donation acts were preceded by a solicitation. Of course, there are different methods of soliciting contributions with varying degrees of effectiveness – but while the degree in effectiveness is determined by the other mechanisms, lab experiments showed that the mere act of actively soliciting rather than passively presenting the opportunity to give increased the likelihood of giving (Lindskold et al. 1977).

The material costs and benefits of a donation also influence on giving: When obstacles to donations are reduced, giving increases (Smith/McSweeney, 2007). Findings suggest that offering advantages in exchange for donor contributions, such as presents or a possible lottery win can increase giving (Buraschi/Cornelli, 2002; Landry et al., 2006). Conversely, Zuckerman et al (1979) and Gruber (2004) found that such a return can also cause a “crowding out” effect for intrinsic motivation to donate and reduce “warm glow” Besides, donors contribute more if they think they will benefit from their donation in the future, for examples by maintaining a public good or service they might need at a later point in time (Burgoyne et al., 2005). In this sense, they see their donation like an investment into their own future.

A donation is motivated by altruism when donors care purely about the impact that the donation has on beneficiaries, not on themselves. The economic definition of altruism suggests that this should lead to a crowding-out effect: If others donate 1€ more, 1€ less is needed to achieve the same outcome for beneficiaries and thus contribution should lower by 1€ (Kingma 1989). Findings on the existence and possible magnitude of this “crowding out” effect are very contradictory, however, with different other mechanisms acting as moderating factors

(Ribar/Wilhelm, 2002).<sup>1</sup> I therefore refrain from including this mechanism in my experiment, since it has already been extensively investigated, with a huge controversy which I cannot hope to overcome.

Reputation is the second mechanism that I refrain from including in my experiment. It has already been tested in lab experiments by publicly displaying the names of donors or distributing visible items such as ribbons or wristbands to donors, which has both shown to increase donations (Grace/Griffin, 2006; West, 2004). Social pressure also showed positive effects on donations, as tested, for example, by Haley/Fessler (2005). However, these mechanisms require that the participant can hope to receive a positive feedback from his/her peers or an increase in status, which is not possible within the double-blind setting of my experiment. Therefore, it remains to further research to test for the relevance of this mechanism for a young and politicized target group.

Findings reveal that the act of giving contributes to the self-image of donors as being altruistic, empathic and socially responsible (Bekkers/Wiepking, 2011, p. 938). Economists speak of “warm glow” or “joy of giving” (Andreoni, 1989) referring to the almost automatic positive emotional response to the act of giving, caused either by avoiding feelings of guilt, acting in line with one’s self-image or a social norm. Different studies suggest that a general positive mood increases giving (Karremans et al., 2005; Soetevent, 2005; Strahilevitz/Myers, 1998; Dolinski et al., 2005), while Erlandsson/Nielson (2015) find that advertisements evoking negative feelings are even more efficient in triggering donations than those evoking positive feelings. Basil et al. (2006) confirm that feelings of guilt and responsibility lead to giving.

Values also motivate donations, in the sense that the donor wants to make the world a better place. What the ideal world would look like largely depends on a person’s value system. People tend to support causes that they believe to change the world in the desired direction (Bennett, 2003; Wiepking, 2009).

Moreover, people contribute to causes when they believe their contribution will make a difference to beneficiaries (Smith/McSweeney, 2007). Experimental studies have found that providing donors with information on aid effectiveness has a positive effect on donations (Jackson/Mathews, 1995; Parsons, 2003, 2007). A positive effect of quality seals attesting aid effectiveness has been proven by Adena et. al (2017).

Studying donation decisions of this special target group is interesting for two reasons: Firstly, according to the Norm Activation Model, protesting and donating are two different expressions of a pro-social value orientation (De Groot/Steeg 2009, p. 444). However, there are no studies

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<sup>1</sup> For an overview of the controversy on altruism as a motivation for donations, compare Bekkers/Wiepking (2011, pp. 936, 949-951).



on the interdependencies between protest participation and donation behavior yet. Secondly, the majority of FFF protesters are very young, with roughly 77% of protesters being school or university students (Sommer et al., 2019). This age group is underrepresented in nearly all available field experiments and surveys on donor behavior as it constitutes a minority of active donors.<sup>2</sup> Having little or no income (yet), pupils and university studies donate less, especially when larger sums are involved. However, Political participation at a young age can have biographical consequences, with many individuals remaining politically engaged throughout their lives. (Wahlstöm et al., 2019; Giugni, 2004; Oesterle et al., 2004). Moreover, in recent years an increasing share of donors below the age of 40 has been reported (Deutscher Spendenrat 2019, p.15). Therefore, this study can contribute to better understand this important future group of donors, and the mechanisms that can motivate their donations.

#### 4. Experimental design

There are different approaches for assessing donor behavior, which all bring along advantages and disadvantages. Donor behavior can be easily observed in field experiments by monitoring the outcome of different fundraising campaigns. In surveys, donations to real organizations are typically investigated over a longer period in population samples. However, both methods do not allow to conclude on causality. Only lab experiments with their completely controlled setting have the potential to test for causal relations and to allow inferences. Lab experiments typically test for short-term effects of manipulations.

For the given research question, I consider a lab experiment to be the best alternative: The target group are teenagers and young adults, who often do not have the financial means to donate and therefore are underrepresented in field studies or surveys. Within the experiment, they earn the money with which they then make the donation decisions. One might argue that following this line of reasoning, the results of the study are irrelevant, since in the real world the participants are not able to make donation decisions due to the lack of financial resources. However, it is only a matter of time before the young people start working and thus have enough financial resources to turn the potential donation preferences already identified in the lab experiment into real donation decisions. The study can also provide insights into the strategies used to motivate especially young adults to donate despite reduced financial resources. The DG offers a very accurate method of reproducing a donation decision. The game consists of a single decision, whereby one player (the “dictator”) determines how to share a monetary

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<sup>2</sup> In Germany, donations are made mainly by the generation over 60 and especially over 70, while people below the age of 30 and 40 are the least and second least important age group, concerning not only the volume, but also the frequency of donations (Deutscher Spendenrat, 2019).

value between herself and a recipient. DGs have widely been used to investigate donor behavior (Bekkers/Wiepking, 2011).

The disadvantage of using a lab experiment to answer my research question is that artificial conditions prevail in the lab and decisions made under these conditions do not necessarily correspond to those made in the real world. In this chapter I will therefore discuss how I design the experiments' details in order to replicate a real donation decision as accurately as possible and to minimize possible interferences caused by the special lab atmosphere.

As mentioned above, the experiment targets FFF participants. Potential participants will be personally invited to the experiment at an FFF demonstration in Cologne. These demonstrations regularly attract 5000-10,000 participants on Fridays. Following a randomized sample strategy, an assistant addresses every fifth person who passes him, invites them orally to an experiment, emphasizes the fact that they can thereby support research, and the opportunity to earn some money and offers them a flyer with more detailed information. Only people who show basic interest will receive a flyer. Only when all 1000 flyers have been distributed, the campaign for recruiting participants is completed. Participants are asked on the flyer to contact the implementation team by phone, mail or whatsapp message to confirm their participation. A total of 240 participants are required. Should it not be possible to attract enough participants at the first demonstration, some of the experiment's sessions will be carried out with sufficient time lag to attract more participants at the next FFF demonstrations in the subsequent weeks.

One possible shortcoming of this study that has to be mentioned is the participant bias: the target group of this study are FFF-participants in general, but for ethical reasons I am restricted to those older than 14, potentially leaving out a share of younger participants.

Participants recruited through flyers that mentioned the opportunity to earn money through the experiment have been found to be less generous and less motivated by non-monetary factors when playing the DG compared to participants recruited through random selection (Eckel/Grossman, 2000). On the other hand, compared to non-volunteers, volunteers have the following characteristics: they are more interested in the topic of the research, more well-educated, more sociable and have a greater need for approval, all characteristics tending to lead to greater contributions in DGs (Rosenthal/ Rosnow, 1976). In summary, the possibility of a participant bias cannot be excluded and must therefore also be included in the discussion of the findings, even if it is unclear in which direction such a bias would alter the results.

The experiment will be conducted at the computer lab of the University of Cologne, using the existing infrastructure at the Institute for Experimental Economics, in six sessions with 40 participants each. Since the university is centrally located in Cologne and the majority of the demonstration participants as pupils and students get free tickets for public transport, it can be

assumed that there will be no high travel costs. The experiment's initial endowment – the show up fee – is relatively high, especially if one considers that the FFF demonstrators are mainly teenagers and young adults that have not yet entered the labor market. The show up fee of 10€ plus the indication that there is the possibility to earn another 10€ during the experiment, should ensure that a sufficient number of invited people will show up. However, a larger number will be invited to each experiment to make sure that at the day of the experiment enough participants are showing up. Surplus participants will receive the show up fee and are sent home afterwards. Each session will be conducted at the same time of day, namely at 5 p.m. on a Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday in order to avoid weekend elation, Monday blues, and to ensure that school-age participants can still participate.

For motives of research ethics, a minimum age of 14 will have to be established for participants. This is already mentioned at the flyer with which participants are recruited. Participants have to be literate and of sound mind to ensure they understand the instructions and can complete the task given in the experiments. Besides, participants who do not understand the provided tasks will be excluded. The same applies to subjects who show a lack of effort by not completing a required minimum percentage of the provided real-effort task, those who intentionally deviate from the provided instructions or quit the experiment before they have completed all parts.

At first, all participants obtain detailed instructions about the course of the experiment. The instructions can be found in Annex A. The main features are orally repeated. We emphasize that any information given in the instructions is true and that no personal data will be disclosed.

The double-blind setup decreases the feeling of scrutiny that participants might feel because they are taking part in an experiment and their actions will be subject to evaluation afterwards. With the double-blind setting, neither the participants nor the experimenters know who is receiving a particular treatment or takes a certain decision. To further avoid potential feelings of social control, participants are seated at a considerable distance from each other and sight protection similar to a polling booth ensures that they cannot possibly observe the decisions their peers are taking. This setting reflects that real-world donation decisions are also mostly made privately and behind closed doors.<sup>3</sup>

Often in lab experiments on donations, participants are given a certain sum of money right at the beginning, which is distributed like a gift and then used to make the donation decision. Thereby, a real-world donation decision, which is about one's own, hard earned money, is not adequately simulated, reducing the transferability of the lab experiments' results to the real

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<sup>3</sup> Exceptions exist when the fundraising strategy is based on generating publicity in order to put potential donors under social pressure or to attract them with possible reputational gains.

world. Subjects might handle their experimental endowment differently than their real-world income. Theory suggests that unexpected gains have a higher marginal propensity to consume than regular income (Engel, 2011, p. 14). Therefore, participants might be more risk seeking as well as willing to use the initial endowment bestowed on them to pay for other considerations like fairness or altruism than they would be when using money earned through work in real life. To create a sense of ownership over the money, I chose to let the participants earn some money during a computer-based real-effort task which then constitutes their endowment in the DG. For 30 minutes, the participants will have to digitize and organize scanned book indexes from the library and organize an inventory. The task will be easy, only requiring reading, writing and typing skills, so that the participants are not overstrained.

Afterwards, participants that digitalized a required minimum number of book indexes are shown a 20€ bill on their screen. The others are excluded from the experiment because they clearly did not show any effort in executing the task and would therefore not feel the same amount of ownership for their endowment. The real payout is only made at the end of the experiment. Participants are then told that they will now be confronted with a number of donation decisions. Six charitable organizations with special projects will be presented to them. For each organization, they can choose if and how much of their income they would like to donate. They are informed that they can, of course, also choose to keep all of their earnings. They are also informed that for the experiment, there is a cooperation with the presented organizations and that their donations will actually be sent to the organizations immediately after the experiment. This is meant to increase the credibility of the experiment. At no point the word "game" is mentioned. The instructions must prevent participants from thinking that they are just playing a game, or that the recipients do not actually exist. Only if the participants take the experiment and their decisions seriously and are sure that the donated money really benefits the presented projects, the results of the experiment can be meaningfully interpreted.

Six out of the eight mechanisms of donor motivation identified by Bekkers/Wiepking (2011) – presented in the theory section and further explored in the literature review – will be tested by the DGs for the target group of FFF demonstrators. For each of the six games there is a control group, in which framing consists of the presentation of an organization with a certain project using a standard formulation, and a treatment group, in which the information contains an additional formulation that is supposed to test the respective mechanism.

If the goal of the study becomes obvious to experimental subjects, they might adapt their behavior accordingly. I neutralize this so-called experimenter demand effect using a strategy introduced by Zizzo (2010), named non-deceptive obfuscation, where the real experimental objective is disguised without lying to participants. Therefore, a different organization and project

is presented in each DG. Participants are to think that the aim of the experiment is to determine whether and for which project they would be more willing to donate.

Preferences for certain projects can be described as external preferences that individuals already have prior to the lab experiments. Deviations from these preferences are called internal preferences and are generated within the experiment, most importantly by the framing. The main goal of this experiment is to explore the internal preferences triggered by the framing of each DG. However, information about external preferences for certain development topics can also be a valuable insight. To allow for a separate analysis and interpretation of the effects of internal and external preferences, it is important to avoid that one project is always matched with the same framing mechanism. Therefore, in the experiment I propose, all organizations (Appendix B) can be combined with all framings (Appendix C) and are randomly matched by the computer program. Each participant plays all six games, the order of which is also randomly allocated to avoid sequencing and learning effects. Each individual will be in the treatment group for three of the experiments and in the control group for the other three. In every game, a different organization is presented in combination with a different framing, and participants make their donation decision. As they have been informed by the experimenter beforehand, their payoff will depend on one randomly assigned donation decision. I chose to apply a „pay one“ approach, because it leads to higher stakes for every single decision. Every decision taken could be the one that counts for the final payoff. Thereby, wealth and portfolio effects as well as cross-task contamination are avoided (Charness et al., 2016).

There are many factors to be considered for they can lead to noise in the data and, thus, limit causal inference. The language used in the instructions is one of them. Therefore, I kept the instructions and the different framings as short and neutral as possible. Organizations and projects will all be presented following the same scheme.

After all donation decisions have been taken, participants fill out a questionnaire about their socio-demographic characteristics. The questionnaire will also cover their donation habits, as well as their opinion about development aid in general and if they have heard about or had any positive or negative experience with one or more of the presented organizations. Participants also have the chance to comment on the experiment and give reasons for their decisions at the end of the questionnaire. The questionnaire is aimed at capturing additional information that could influence donation behavior according to the theory, thereby facilitating the interpretation of the findings.

After handing in the questionnaire, the experiment is over. Participants get the chance to request an e-mail with additional information on the projects and organizations mentioned in the experiment to their own e-mail address.

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# Annex

## Annex A: Protocol

[...] Text in brackets is only for orientation. Do not read it out to the participants.

### [BASIC INSTRUCTIONS]

Welcome to this experiment on human behavior, please make yourselves comfortable. I am [NAME OF ASSISTANT] and I will guide you through today's workshop that will last approximately 90 minutes. I want to inform you that you can leave whenever you want, no matter if the session has already started or not.

During today's session, you have the opportunity to gain real money by performing a task. For this experiment, we cooperate with a range of charitable organizations and at the end of the experiment, you can donate part of your income. We will present six organizations and their respective projects to you and for each of them you can choose how much of your earnings you would donate. At the end, one of the organizations is randomly chosen and your donation decision for this organization will turn into reality. Of course, you are also allowed to keep all your income.

In our experiment, we make sure that no one, including us the experimenters, will know the decisions you take. To this end, you have a personalized ID number, which you can see in the upper right corner of your screen. This number allows you to identify in order to receive your payoff at the end of the experiment. Yet it will not, at any time, be associated to your name.

Each of you will receive 10€ for taking part in the experiment. Additionally, you can earn another 10€ within the next 30 minutes by completing the tasks that will shortly appear upon your screens. Please execute your task carefully, otherwise you will not earn the additional 10€ and be excluded from the experiment. Instructions will also be shown on your screen. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of our assistants will come to help you. Please do not ask your question aloud. Also, please do not talk to each other before the experiment begins or during the experiment.

### [REAL-EFFORT TASK]

For the first part of today's session, you have forty-five minutes to fulfill the tasks that now appear on your screen. Again, if you have any questions concerning the task, please raise your hand and one of our assistants will come to help you. Please do not ask your question aloud and do not talk to each other.

[Give participants thirty minutes to complete the task. Tell them when 30 and 15 minutes are left and speak up again when the time is up]

[DICTATOR GAMES WITH DONATION DECISIONS]

Now, thank you very much for completing the task. If you completed the task and earned an additional 10€, this will now appear on your screen.

[10€ bills appear on every screen. Any participants that did not digitalize at least 5 index cards have not shown any effort in the task and are therefore excluded from the game. Ask them to leave the room and get their 10€ show-up fee outside.]

In the second part of today's session, you can now choose to donate some of your money to a charitable organization, if you wish to. Six charitable organizations will be presented to you. For each organization and project, you can choose if and how much of your income you would like to donate. You can only donate round euro amounts, not cent amounts. Of course, you can also choose to keep all of your earnings. At the end, one of the six donation decisions you made will be randomly chosen to determine your final payout. For this experiment, we cooperate with the presented organizations. Your donations will be sent to the organizations immediately after the experiment.

Again, it is very important that you understand the rules. If you have any questions at any point, please do not hesitate to raise your hand. One of our assistants will then come to your seat and help you. Please, do not speak up aloud and do not communicate with the other participants. If you are ready, the first organization will now appear on your screen.

[Dictator games are played, after the games are completed, speak up again]

Thank you very much for participating in this experiment and also for any donations you might have made. If you press the "next"-button, a pre-written e-mail including the web-links to the projects that were just presented to you will appear on your screen. Include your e-mail address if you would like to learn more on these projects and organizations. We will not use the e-mail address you enter for any other purpose.

Before we finish, we would also like you to complete our basic questionnaire. Please answer the questions carefully, since the answers are important for our research. Remember that the information is anonymous and cannot be linked to your identity afterwards. Of course, you have the right to refrain from providing any information you do not wish to disclose. However, we would be very happy if you completed the whole questionnaire since the data is important for our research. You can start now; it should not take more than 10 minutes to fill out the questionnaire.

[Participants fill out the questionnaire. After all questionnaires are completed, speak up again]

So, now it is time you get your payoff! The computer will now randomly choose one of the six organizations for your donation decision. Click on the “Next”-button to see which is the organization that was chosen for your payout, how much money you have chosen to donate to that organization and how much money you will receive. Please confirm with OK. If you have any questions, raise your hand and one of the assistants will help you.

[Wait a moment]

We will now hand out your earnings, one for one, starting with the first person on the left. Please stay seated and wait until it is your turn, then come to us. After you tell us your player ID, we will hand you an envelope with your payout . Please check if it contains the right amount of money.

If you wish, you can approach our colleague outside if you are interested in receiving a donation receipt from the organization.

[Call each participant individually to receive envelopes with pay-out. Put the money in an envelope, close it, and hand it to the participant. Make sure the participants leave the area and do not witness the pay-off given to other participants. Thank them for their participation.]

## Annex B: List of organizations

Organization	Beneficiaries	Project theme	Expected outcome	Country	Further information
Save the children	Young adults	AIDS prevention program	expand access to quality information and services, establish peer support networks, and ensure that services are youth friendly so young people can make healthy decisions and adopt protective practices.	Mozambique	<a href="#">Link</a>
Misereor	Vulnerable traditional communities	Environmental protection program	Help residents to stand up for their rights: pay lawyers, organize campaigns or train community leaders with the aim of putting an end to injustice and environmental degradation.	Brazilian amazon rain forest	<a href="#">Link</a>
Welthungerhilfe	Refugees	Humanitarian aid project	distribute vouchers that people in refugee camps can exchange for what they need most, including food, hygiene products, seeds and garden tools and others. The vouchers also promote the local economy and keep markets functioning.	Syria	<a href="#">Link</a>

Save the children	Illiterate children and adults	Program called “Literacy boost”	create a culture of reading both inside and outside the classroom by training teachers in didactic methodologies and get communities involved in learning by providing books, libraries and supplies.	Malaysia	<a href="#">Link</a>
Village bicycle project	Rural communities	Project for sustainable mobility and rural integration	empower rural communities by strengthening bicycle culture. Subsidized bicycles, hands-on maintenance training for new owners, provision of bike tools and spare parts to ensure affordable and sustainable transportation.	Ghana, Sierra Leone	<a href="#">Link</a>
Bread for the world	Peasants	Climate change mitigation program	Particularly vulnerable population groups to adapt to climate change and become more resilient to extreme weather events. For example, smallholders are learning to use improved cultivation methods and traditional, robust vegetable varieties.	Cambodia	<a href="#">Link</a>

## Annex C: Dictator games and framing

### Standard framing:

*“The money you earned in the last hour is your payout from this experiment. You can now donate some or all of your money to a charitable development project. Six charitable organizations will be presented to you. For each organization and project, you can choose if and how much of your income you would like to donate. You can only donate round euro amounts, not cent amounts. Of course, you can also choose to keep all your earnings. At the end, one of the six donation decisions you made will be randomly assigned for payout. For this experiment, we cooperate with the presented organizations. Your donations will be sent to the organizations immediately after the experiment.*

*Project 1 [2,3,4,5,6] is conducted by **ORGANIZATION**. The **PROJECT THEME** focuses on **TARGET GROUP** in **COUNTRY**. The aim of this project is to **EXPECTED OUTCOME**.*

*Please indicate the amount of money you would like to donate below. If you do not wish to donate, mark “zero”. The donation is voluntary and anonymous. Nobody, including the researchers, will be able to track if or how much you donated.”*

### Example:

*“[...] Project 1 is conducted by Save the Children. Their AIDS prevention program focuses on young adults in Mozambique. The aim of this project is to expand access to quality information*

*and services, establish peer support networks, and ensure that services are youth friendly so young people can make healthy decisions and adopt protective practices. [...].”*

As stated in chapter 4, in the experiment each organization is going to be matched with each framing. To keep this annex as simple and short as possible, however, I introduce the framings used in each game in connection with only one organization, as an example. As shown above, there is a standard framing, in which the information on each organization, which can be found in the table in Annex 3, will be introduced. For the control group, the standard framing is used. For the treatment group, additional formulations as printed in bold are included.

#### Dictator Game 1: Awareness of need

Hypothesis 1: Higher awareness of recipients' needs will increase the total amount of donations.

- Control group:  
*Standard framing*
  
- Treatment:  
*“[...] Project 1 is conducted by Save the Children. Their AIDS prevention program focuses on young adults in Mozambique **who are in urgent need of help**. The aim of this project is to expand access to quality information and services, establish peer support networks, and ensure that services are youth friendly so young people can make healthy decisions and adopt protective practices. [...].”*

#### Dictator Game 2: Solicitation

Hypothesis 2: Actively soliciting a donation will increase the total amount of donations.

- Control group:  
*Standard framing*
  
- Treatment group:  
*“[...] **We kindly ask you to donate to project 2**, conducted by Misereor. Their environmental protection program in the amazon rain forest targets vulnerable traditional communities. The aim of the project is to help residents to stand up for their rights and put an end to injustice and environmental degradation by paying lawyers, organizing campaigns or training community leaders. [...]*

#### Dictator Game 3: Cost and benefit

Hypothesis 3: If the solicitation emphasizes the benefit of the donation, the total amount of donations will increase.

- Control group:  
*Standard framing*
  
- Treatment group:  

*“[...] Project 3 is conducted by Bread for the world. Their climate change mitigation program focuses on Peasants in Cambodia. The aim of this project is to help particularly vulnerable population groups to adapt to climate change and become more resilient to extreme weather events. For example, smallholders are learning to use improved cultivation methods and traditional, robust vegetable varieties. **An investment into climate change mitigation is an investment into your own future.** [...].”*

#### Dictator Game 4: Psychological benefits

Hypothesis 4: If the donation solicitation evokes feelings of guilt, the donation offers the donor to relieve this guilt and this will result in a higher amount of total donations.

- Control group:  
*Standard text*
  
- Treatment group:  

*“[...] Project 5 is conducted by Save the children. The humanitarian aid project focuses on refugees in Syria. The aim of this project is to distribute vouchers that people in refugee camps can exchange for what they need most, including food, hygiene products, seeds and garden tools and others. The vouchers also promote the local economy and keep markets functioning. **Imagine how you would feel not helping!** [...].”*

#### Dictator Game 5: Values

Hypothesis 5: If the donation solicitation emphasizes on values that are in line with the self-image and social norms of the donor, this will result in a higher amount of donations.

- Control group:  
*Standard text*
  
- Treatment group:  

*“[...] Project 4 is conducted by Welthungerhilfe. The education program called “Literacy boost” focuses on illiterate children and adults in Malaysia. The aim of this project is to create a culture of reading both inside and outside the classroom by training teachers in didactic methodologies and by providing books, libraries and supplies to get communities involved in learning. **Do you believe that every person should have the right to a quality education? Then make the world a better place by contributing to this literacy project!** [...].”*

#### Dictator Game 6: Efficacy

Hypothesis 6: If the solicitation emphasizes the aid effectiveness, this will result in a higher amount of donations.

➤ Control group:  
*Standard text*

➤ Treatment group:

*"[...] Project 6 is conducted by the village bicycle project. The Project for sustainable mobility and rural integration targets Rural communities in Ghana and Sierra Leone. The aim of this project is to empower rural communities by strengthening bicycle culture. Subsidized bicycles, hands-on maintenance training for new owners, provision of bike tools and spare parts to ensure affordable and sustainable transportation.*

***This organization is a holder of a DZI certificate, a quality seal for charitable organizations which certifies transparently, purposefully, efficiently and cost-effective use of their funds in compliance with tax regulations. The certificate is reviewed and renewed annually." [...]."***



## **Eidesstattliche Erklärung**

Ich versichere durch eigenhändige Unterschrift, dass ich die Arbeit selbstständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel angefertigt habe. Alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinn-gemäß aus Veröffentlichungen (auch aus dem Internet) entnommen sind, habe ich als solche kenntlich gemacht. Ich weiß, dass bei Abgabe einer falschen Versicherung die Arbeit als mit 9 'nicht ausreichend' (1 Bewertungspunkt gemäß § 16 Abs. 2 Allgemeine Bestimmungen, Note 5, ECTS-Grade F) bewertet gilt.

Bonn, 04.04.2020

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**Ort, Datum**

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**Unterschrift**